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CELL PHONES ARE ORWELL’S TELESCREEN: 
THE NEED FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION IN REAL-TIME CELL PHONE 
LOCATION INFORMATION 
MATTHEW DEVOY JONES* 
ABSTRACT 
Courts are divided as to whether law enforcement can collect cell phone location 
information in real-time without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. This Article 
argues that Carpenter v. United States requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment 
prior to law enforcement’s collection of real-time cell phone location information. 
Courts that have required a warrant prior to the government’s collection of real-time 
cell phone location information have considered the length of surveillance. This 
should not be a factor. The growing prevalence and usage of cell phones and cell phone 
technology, the original intent of the Fourth Amendment, and United States Supreme 
Court case law are the deciding factors. 
Research has shown that a cell phone can be located through its basic functioning 
as it automatically connects to a growing number of cell sites. The fact that nearly all 
Americans have a cell phone and carry it on their person, makes a cell phone’s location 
that of the phone’s user, essentially acting as a monitoring device. Permitting law 
enforcement to collect this location information in real-time without a warrant under 
the Fourth Amendment violates the principles of the Amendment, which is to curb 
arbitrary government power. Twenty-first century United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence furthers this argument. The Court recently found, in Carpenter v. United 
States, that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical 
movements as captured through historical cell cite location information (“CSLI”). The 
same rationale in deciding Carpenter also applies to the real-time CSLI and GPS data 
emanating from one’s phone: neither United States v. Knotts nor the third-party 
doctrine are applicable to real-time cell phone monitoring. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mary Ann and Kent Jeffries, a married couple from southern Texas, were 
celebrating their twentieth wedding anniversary.1 The couple traveled to Chicago for 
a long weekend, leaving their two teenage children to bear the Texas summer heat. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries took their smartphones on the trip. 
Michael Rivera-Guerrero, a life-long resident of the Pilsen neighborhood in 
Chicago, was recently laid-off from his job as an assembler at a local factory. A month 
earlier he promised his son that the two would go to a Sox-Cubs game at Guaranteed 
Rate Field. To keep his promise, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero decided it was in his best 
interest to turn to a life of crime. Rivera-Guerrero always carried his smartphone on 
his person. 
Prior to leaving their hotel on Michigan Avenue, Mrs. Jeffries put her phone in “do 
not disturb” mode. She did not want to be bothered by any notifications while visiting 
the Windy City. Mr. Jeffries, ever the workaholic, turned the volume to one-hundred 
percent on his phone. He did not want to miss any calls, texts, or emails from work. 
He also launched his Maps mobile application to direct the couple to the closest place 
to grab a cup of coffee before heading to Millennium Park. 
Earlier that morning, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero took the “L” to downtown Chicago. He 
waited outside of a Starbucks until it was nearly empty. While he was inside 
demanding money from the cash register, Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries were standing outside 
of the Starbucks. As Mr. Rivera-Guerrero hurried his way out of Starbucks with a 
                                                          
 1  This fictional story demonstrates a plausible scenario that could arise from the current 
state of data privacy law in the United States. 
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book bag full of cash, the Jeffries noted something was wrong and left to grab coffee 
elsewhere. 
The Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) was immediately made aware of the 
robbery. To assist in their investigation, the CPD obtained a court order to access 
location information from cell phone service providers that would identify cell phones 
that were within the vicinity of the Starbucks at the time of the robbery. Due to the 
density of downtown Chicago, the CPD was able to get location information from 
multiple cell phones, including those of Mr. Rivera-Guerrero and the Jeffries. After 
obtaining the numbers of the individuals that were within the vicinity of the Starbucks 
at the time of the robbery, the CPD obtained a separate court order asking for the real-
time location information for those same numbers—again, including Mr. Rivera-
Guerrero and Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries. 
Meanwhile, the Jeffries continued exploring the city. After grabbing dinner the 
following evening, the couple decided to attend Guaranteed Rate Field for a Sox-Cubs 
game. Unbeknownst to them, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero and his son were also in 
attendance—facts known by the CPD. The CPD arrested both Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries, 
as well as Mr. Rivera-Guerrero, for questioning. 
The CPD revealed to Mr. Jeffries during the questioning that it had evidence that 
he was at the scene of the robbery. The CPD also revealed that it had evidence that he 
frequented locations within Chicago often frequented by tourists, asking whether he 
was there to prey on tourists. Police obtained this information from Mr. Jeffries’ use 
of his smartphone’s Maps app that he used for walking directions, which utilized GPS. 
His whereabouts were also obtained from cell-site locators, to which his smartphone 
connected whenever it was searching for a connection, receiving or sending a call, 
text, or email. 
In a separate room, the CPD revealed to Mrs. Jeffries that it had evidence that she 
was at the scene of the robbery. The CPD also revealed that it had evidence that she 
visited locations within Chicago often frequented by tourists, asking whether she was 
there to prey on tourists. Police obtained this information from Mrs. Jeffries’ 
smartphone connecting to cell-site locators, to which her smartphone connected in the 
same way her husband’s did.2 
The CPD allowed the Jeffries to leave the station after understanding that they 
were in town celebrating their wedding anniversary and it was Mr. Rivera-Guerrero 
who committed the robbery. Though their anniversary was ruined and the couple 
missed their flight home, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Jeffries pressed charges. 
Weeks later, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the historic 
and real-time cell phone location information, arguing that the evidence was obtained 
unlawfully. His attorney argued that the CPD should have obtained a warrant before 
they began tracking Mr. Rivera-Guerrero’s smartphone. The court agreed that the 
historic cell phone location information was obtained unlawfully under Carpenter v. 
United States—but what about the real-time cell phone location information? Should 
a warrant be required when the government utilizes an individual’s cell phone to locate 
or track that individual in real-time? The pre-Carpenter courts have been divided on 
                                                          
 2  Though Mrs. Jeffries had her phone in “do not disturb mode,” all texts and calls—likely 
from her two teenage boys—that she had received during this time resulted in the collection of 
her location. 
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whether the Fourth Amendment provides individuals with a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their cell phone’s real-time location information.3 
This Article argues that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment must be obtained 
prior to collection of real-time location information from a user’s cell phone. Section 
II discusses cell phones, cell phone location information, and how the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment applies to such information. Section II also discusses United 
States Supreme Court decisions regarding electronic surveillance of individuals by the 
government. 
Section III discusses the different approaches that twenty-first century courts have 
taken when deciding whether the Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement’s 
collection of cell phone location information. Section IV explains why a warrant based 
on probable cause is required to collect such information, focusing on legal and public 
policy arguments. Section V provides two solutions to ensure individuals have Fourth 
Amendment protection in the cell phone location information emanating from their 
phone in real-time. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF REAL-TIME CELL PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION 
TO TRACK INDIVIDUALS 
Law enforcement’s use of real-time cell phone location information to track 
individuals’ movements under the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause 
was explicitly left as an open issue in a recent United States Supreme Court case, 
Carpenter v. United States.4 This Section briefly discusses the pervasiveness of cell 
phones. This Section also discusses background information on cell phone location 
information including how it functions and its precision. The Fourth Amendment and 
its applicability to tracking an individual using real-time cell phone location 
information will then be discussed. Lastly, this Section discusses United States 
Supreme Court decisions relating to electronic surveillance. 
A. Cell Phones Today 
The prevalence of cell phones in America is continuing to grow.5 Today, nearly all 
Americans—95%—own a cell phone of some kind.6 A vast majority of Americans—
around 80%—own smartphones.7 Smartphones are cell phones with a broad range of 
functions, acting as minicomputers that just so happen to be used as telephones.8 “They 
                                                          
 3  For courts finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location 
information, see United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Tracey v. 
Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). But see United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 
2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 4  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 5  Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 5, 2018), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/#. 
 6  Id. 
 7  Id.; see also DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION 7 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-media-
telecommunications/us-tmt-2017-global-mobile-consumer-survey-executive-summary.pdf. 
 8  See Smartphone, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/smartphone (last visited April 8, 2019); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 
2480; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 137. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/6
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could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape 
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”9 For instance, 
one-in-five American adults use smartphones as their primary means of online access 
at home, making cell phones even more necessary for these individuals.10 To utilize 
these broad range of functions, smartphone users download mobile applications 
(“apps”), the average of which is thirty-three per user.11 
As these numbers show, it is nearly impossible to live in the United States without 
a cell phone.12 Individuals use cell phones while shopping, watching television, 
relaxing, eating (both at home and at restaurants), and while in public spaces (driving 
or walking).13 This means that cell phone users usually keep the phone on their person, 
rarely leaving its presence.14 
To purchase and use a cell phone, individuals must agree to legal terms and 
conditions, ranging from the cell phone provider and manufacturer to an app creator.15 
In fact, 91% of users “accept legal terms and conditions without reading them before 
installing apps, registering Wi-Fi hotspots, accepting updates, and signing on to online 
services such as video streaming.”16 However, even if read, the vast majority of terms 
and conditions are too complex for many people to understand.17 In fact, of the four 
largest service providers in the United States, only one has a privacy policy that states 
that location information may be disclosed to the government when served with lawful 
process.18 Of further concern, users do not consider accepting terms and conditions a 
                                                          
 9  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
 10  PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 5. 
 11  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petiioner in No. 13-132, p. 9). An app is a software program that is 
downloaded and accessed on a smartphone, or other device connected to the internet such as a 
tablet or smart TV. Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps. 
 12  DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 13. 
 13  Id. at 3. 
 14  See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2013 Mobile Consumer Habits 
Study (June 2013)); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 348 (4th Cir. 2015); United States 
v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re Application for Telephone 
Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023–25 (N.D. Cal. 
2015); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504, 524 (Fla. 2014). 
 15  DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 12. 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint are the four largest cell service providers in the 
United States, as of the second fiscal quarter of 2018. Mike Dano, How Verizon, AT&T, T-
Mobile, Sprint and More Stacked up in Q2 2018: The Top 7 Carriers, FIERCE WIRELESS (Aug. 
13, 2018), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/how-verizon-at-t-t-mobile-sprint-and-
more-stacked-up-q2-2018-top-7-carriers. Of the four, only T-Mobile’s terms state that location 
information may be shared with the government. Privacy Policy & Personal Information, T-
MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/privacy/privacy-policy (last visited Nov. 2, 
2018) (stating that T-Mobile “may disclose, without your consent, the approximate location of 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
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barrier to cell phone use given the absence of choice.19 As a result, many cell phone 
users are left without another option but to accept these terms and conditions, as doing 
otherwise is unthinkable in modern society. Cell phone use and ownership will likely 
continue to grow, making the issue of warrantless collection of real-time cell phone 
location information a mounting problem. 
B. The Development and Use of Cell Phone Location Information 
A cell phone’s location can be tracked through cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) or global positioning system (“GPS”) data.20 Obtaining location information 
through either of these methods reveals details about an individual that is not likely to 
be obtained otherwise.21 
Cellular service providers maintain a network of radio “base stations” to and from 
which a cell phone sends and receives radio signals.22 These base stations are towers 
or antennae.23 A cell site, in turn, is a specific portion of the tower or antennae “which 
detects the radio signal emanating from a cell phone and connects the cell phone to 
                                                          
a wireless device to a governmental entity or law enforcement authority when we are served 
with lawful process.”). 
 19  DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 12. 
 20  Cell Phone Location Tracking or CSLI: A Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/2017/10/30/cell_phone_location_information 
_one_pager_0.pdf. A cell-site simulator (“CSS”)—also referred to as a StingRay, Hailstorm, or 
TriggerFish—is another means that the government can use to collect real-time cell phone 
location information. It is a device that mimics a service provider’s tower or antennae. Cindy 
Ham, How Lambis and CSLI Litigation Mandate Warrants for Cell-Site Simulators Usage in 
New York, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 509 (2017) (citing Sam Biddle, Long-Secret Stingray Manuals 
Detail How Police Can Spy on Phones, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 12, 2016), 
https://theintercept.com/2016/09/12/long-secret-stingraymanuals-detail-how-police-can-spy-
on-phones/). As a result, it forces cell phones to transmit radio signals to the simulator, believing 
that the simulator is the most attractive “base station” in the area. Id. With the CSS, the 
government “‘cuts out the cellular service provider and obtains CSLI directly.’” United States 
v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing United States v. Lambis, 197 F. 
Supp. 3d 606, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). Though CSS is not a focus of this Article, as real-time 
CSLI and GPS data is, it is still important to note that this is another means to obtain the same 
information. Additionally, Bluetooth beacons also have the potential to pinpoint the location of 
a cell phone and its user to a matter of inches. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data, 977 F. Supp. 
2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Again, this is just another means to the same end. 
 21  Marissa Kay, Reviving the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a 
Cell Phone Age, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 555, 573, 577 (citations omitted).  
 22  United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application for 
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1013 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015) (citing Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation 
Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland 
Security, and Investigations, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 50 (2013) 
[hereinafter ECPA Hearing] (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)). 
 23  Cellular Phone Towers, AM. CANCER SOC’Y (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/radiation-exposure/cellular-phone-towers.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2019); see also Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; In re Application for Telephone 
Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1013 (citing ECPA 
Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/6
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the local cellular network or Internet.”24 “Although cell sites are usually mounted on 
[base stations,] they can also be found on light posts, flagpoles, church steeples, or the 
sides of buildings.”25 As a cell phone and its user move from place to place, the cell 
phone’s signal is automatically sent to the tower that provides the best reception, 
typically the nearest cell site.26 This creates CSLI.27 The resulting CSLI identifies the 
precise location of the tower or antennae, and cell site at particular points in time, 
approximating, within feet, the whereabouts of the cell phone’s user.28 
The government may locate and track a person by collecting two types of CSLI, 
historical CSLI or real-time CSLI.29 Historical CSLI refers to where an individual’s 
cell phone has been located at some point in the past.30 As will be mentioned below, 
this was the subject of Carpenter and is not the subject of this Article, though the legal 
arguments related to historical CSLI are still important. On the other hand, real-time 
CSLI refers to where an individual’s cell phone is presently located.31 
The precision of real-time CSLI varies based upon the number of cell sites in the 
area.32 If the cell phone is within range of three cell sites, known as triangulation, the 
location discerned from this data is nearly as precise as GPS.33 In highly populated 
areas, such as cosmopolitan areas like downtown Chicago, a cell phone can connect 
to microcells and femtocells, in addition to base stations, which can reveal location 
                                                          
 24  In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1014 (citing ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, 
Univ. of Pennsylvania)); see also Types of Cell Sites, STEEL IN THE AIR, 
https://www.steelintheair.com/cell-site-types/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).  
 25  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018); see also AM. CANCER SOC’Y, 
supra note 23. 
 26  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Graham, 796 F.3d at 343. 
 27  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; In re Application for 
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1014 (citing 
ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)). 
 28  Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a 
Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1014 (citing ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written 
testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)).  
 29  See Steven M. Harkins, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to Protect 
What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1882 (2011) (citing 
Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use 
of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004)).  
 30  R. Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the Founders Never Dreamed of: Phones as 
Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 63 (2014).  
 31  Id. 
 32  Eric Pait, Find My Suspect: Tracking People in the Age of Cell Phones, 2 GEO. L. TECH. 
REV. 155, 157 (2017); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018). 
 33  See Pait, supra note 32, at 158; see also United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 260 (3rd 
Cir. 2017); In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 
119 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 (citing ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt 
Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)). 
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information within the nearest foot.34 This means the greater the concentration of cell 
sites, the smaller the coverage area.35 A record number of cell sites were in operation 
at the end of 2017, providing increased precision of real-time CSLI.36 
Like CSLI, the government can track an individual using their cell phone’s internal 
GPS locator to obtain a “precise, real-time location of the device without using CSLI 
and without its user knowing.”37 For necessary background, the GPS system used in 
cell phones comes from twenty-four GPS satellites in the United States.38 Radio 
signals are received by a cell phone from this system of satellites, and then interpreted 
by programs to provide highly accurate location data.39 GPS in cell phones was first 
used to improve emergency response by giving emergency operators the exact location 
of the person in need rather than relying on the reporter’s estimated location.40 Now, 
however, GPS in cell phones is used for more than aiding those in need.41 
Individuals use smartphone GPS to locate dining and entertainment venues, as well 
as to obtain driving or walking directions.42 Many of the apps that users have on their 
phone require GPS in order for that app to function.43 For example, when a user 
activates the GPS on his or her phone, it reports back real-time traffic conditions after 
crowdsourcing the speed of all cell phones on any particular road.44 Law enforcement 
                                                          
 34  Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of 
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 677, 710–711 (2011); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–
12; United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 540, 542 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 35  Freiwald, supra note 34; see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12. 
 36  The State of Wireless 2018, CTIA (July 10, 2018) https://www.ctia.org/news/the-state-
of-wireless-2018. 
 37  Pait, supra note 32. 
 38  What Is GPS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 39  See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013).  
 40  Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology 
and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 422, 477 
(2011). 
 41  See, e.g., Sonja Thompson, 10 Smartphone Features that I’m Pretty Darn Thankful for, 
TECH REPUBLIC (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/10-
smartphone-features-that-im-pretty-darn-thankful-for/. 
 42  New Research Shows Consumers Want a Side of Technology with Their Meals, NAT’L 
REST. ASS’N (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.restaurant.org/News-Research/News/New-
researchshows-consumers-want-a-side-of-techno; see also DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 13. 
 43  DJ Pangburn, How—And Why—Apple, Google, And Facebook Follow You Around in 
Real Life, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 12, 2017) https://www.fastcompany.com/40477441/facebook-
google-apple-know-where-you-are. 
 44  See Waze—Crowdsourcing Maps and Traffic Information, DIGITAL INNOVATION AND 
TRANSFORMATION A COURSE AT HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Dec. 6, 2015) 
https://digit.hbs.org/submission/waze-crowdsourcing-maps-and-traffic-information/; see also 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 428–29 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/6
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uses this “continuous, detailed, and real-time location, speed, direction, and duration 
information” to obtain the whereabouts of suspected criminals or individuals.45 
The accuracy and flexibility of real-time cell phone location information is an 
advantage to law enforcement when investigating a crime.46 For example, current GPS 
technology typically achieves spatial resolution within about fifteen feet.47 This 
means, for example, that law enforcement could locate an individual using his or her 
cell phone within approximately fifteen feet of the individual’s exact location, 
including in his or her home.48 Real-time cell phone location information also makes 
it easier to collect detailed information “without incurring the commensurate costs in 
dedicated employee resources, salary, benefits, [maintenance,] and overtime pay.”49 
Law enforcement can locate individuals in this manner from any location, making 
such surveillance not only cheaper but vastly superior to visual surveillance because 
“no one human or organization of human observers is currently capable of such 
comprehensive, continuous, and accurate information regarding location and 
movement monitoring.”50 While there is a potential disparity in precision between 
real-time CSLI and GPS data, these two methods provide the government with the 
current location of a cell phone’s user anywhere in the country based solely on his or 
her cell phone number.51 
C. Attached at the Hip: The Fourth Amendment and Real-Time Cell Phone Location 
Information 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of United States citizens “to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”52 The Fourth Amendment also states the grounds on which the government 
can perform searches and seizures: the government must obtain a warrant issued on 
“probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”53 Because the Fourth 
Amendment does not mention cell phones or real-time location information, an 
inquiry into the Framers’ motives for drafting the Fourth Amendment and United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence is beneficial to understanding the relation 
between the Fourth Amendment and real-time cell phone location information. 
                                                          
 45  See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013); Lenese C. Herbert, Challenging the 
(Un)constitutionality of Governmental GPS Surveillance, 26 CRIM. JUST. 34, 34 (2011). 
 46  Pait, supra note 32, at 155. 
 47  GPS Accuracy, gps.gov (Dec. 5, 2017), 
https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/. 
 48  Earls, 70 A.3d at 636, 639. 
 49  In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a 
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (D. Md. 2011). 
 50  Herbert, supra note 45, at 35; see also In re Application of the U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 
540. 
 51  Pait, supra note 32, at 159. 
 52  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 53  Id. 
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The Framers of the Amendment were influenced by government action—in 
England and the American colonies—which violated personal liberties, specifically in 
three cases.54 In two English cases, Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood, the 
government seized property using general warrants—warrants with no names or 
places to be searched.55 The courts struck down the general warrants and judgment 
was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in both cases.56 This was a “monument of English 
freedom” familiar to all Americans at the time the Constitution was adopted.57 In the 
Massachusetts Writs of Assistance case, the government searched any place where the 
sought after property could be hidden without any suspicion the goods were actually 
there.58 Unlike in Entick and Wilkes, the search was ruled legal and judgment was 
entered in favor of the government.59 The use of general warrants in these cases and, 
“as John Adams recalled, the patriot James Otis’s 1761 speech condemning writs of 
assistance [were] ‘the first act[s] of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain’ 
and helped spark the Revolution itself.”60 In sum, “a central aim of the Framers was 
‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’”61 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence gives guidance on many of the terms that the 
Fourth Amendment contains. For example, a search requiring a warrant based on 
probable cause occurs in two circumstances. First, a search occurs when law 
enforcement trespasses on a searched person’s property, also known as a physical 
intrusion.62 Second, a search occurs when a searched person’s expectation of privacy 
in the thing searched is reasonable and society believes that the expectation of privacy 
is reasonable.63 The Court has also defined the terms seizure and probable cause.64 In 
addition, the Court has crafted numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement 
including exigent circumstances, arrests outside the home, searches incident to arrest, 
inventory searches, automobiles, and street stops and frisks.65 
                                                          
 54  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). 
 55  Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.); Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 19 
How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P.). 
 56  Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029; Wilkes, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1153. 
 57  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
 58  Writs of Assistance Trial: 1761, JRANK ARTICLES (Mar. 9, 2019), 
https://law.jrank.org/pages/2353/Writs-Assistance-Trial-1761.html. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). 
 61  Id. at 2214. 
 62  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 63  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
 64  A seizure has been defined as a “meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory 
interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). Persons may also be 
seized, but this is not at issue here. Probable cause has been defined as “a fair probability.” 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983).  
 65  Such exceptions include: exigent circumstances, arrests outside the home, searches 
incident to arrest, inventory searches, automobiles, and street stops and frisks. WILLIAM J. 
STUNTZ, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 328 (Edwin 
Meese III et al. eds., 2005). The exception that will most likely apply to collection of a 
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The Supreme Court has also confirmed that the basic purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary 
invasions by governmental officials.”66 “[T]he Amendment seeks to secure ‘the 
privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’”67 It “was the founding generation’s 
response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, 
which[, as mentioned above,] allowed British officers to rummage through homes in 
an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”68 Through this historical 
background, it is clear that real-time cell phone location information falls within the 
purview of the Fourth Amendment. 
D. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: Setting the 
Stage for Real-Time Cell Phone Tracking 
The United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has 
evolved, while keeping intact the Framers’ intent. This subsection focuses on three 
prominent twentieth century United States Supreme Court cases that have provided 
the backdrop to cell phone tracking jurisprudence, and five twenty-first century 
Supreme Court cases that have set the groundwork for real-time cell phone tracking 
jurisprudence. As evident from the case law below, individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their real-time cell phone location information. 
1. Katz, Knotts, and Karo 
The Supreme Court established the reasonable expectation standard in Katz v. 
United States.69 In Katz, the petitioner challenged the government’s attachment of an 
eavesdropping device to a public phone booth as a violation of his constitutional 
rights.70 The Court found that a conversation is protected from unreasonable search 
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”71 Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion launched the “Katz test,” consisting 
of a two-part inquiry.72 In order to determine whether a search violated a person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights, courts must consider whether: (1) the individual manifested 
a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search; and (2) 
                                                          
smartphone user’s GPS information is exigent circumstances. See United States v. Banks, 884 
F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 2018). “Courts recognize the existence of exigent circumstances to justify 
a warrantless search in several situation, including: to prevent the destruction of evidence, to 
[ensure safety,] when police are in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect, or when other emergency 
circumstances exist, such as the need to assist injured individuals.” Patterson v. North Carolina, 
No. 5:12 cv-182-RJC, 2013 WL 170431, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 16, 2013). The standard under 
exigent circumstances is a “reasonable suspicion”—a lower standard than probable cause. Id.  
 66  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213. 
 67  Id. at 2214. 
 68  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 69  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967). 
 70  Id. at 348. 
 71  Id. at 360. 
 72  Id. at 360–61. 
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society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.73 This test has been 
applied in numerous cell phone location information cases.74 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts set forth the proposition that 
individuals have no expectation of privacy on public roadways.75 In Knotts, federal 
agents placed a beeper into a container that was to be purchased by respondent.76 The 
agents were able to monitor the movement of the container as it moved along the 
highway and eventually to respondent’s home.77 The Court held that “[a] person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”78 The Court found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy because the information obtained had been voluntarily 
conveyed to the public by traveling on public roads.79 This rule has effectively been 
overruled beginning in United States v. Jones, and later in Carpenter.80 
In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court considered whether the installation of 
a beeper in a container amounted to a search or seizure.81 Federal agents installed a 
beeper on a container in order to locate the movement of the container from location 
to location.82 The Court held that the installation, with the consent of the original 
owner, does not invade a buyer’s privacy when the buyer had no knowledge of the 
presence of the beeper.83 However, the Court found that monitoring a beeper in a 
private residence violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights because a warrant must 
be obtained in order to search a house.84 
2. Kyllo, Jones, Jardines, and Riley 
The Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States considered whether the use of a 
thermal-imaging device aimed at a home from the street constituted a search.85 Federal 
agents used a thermal imager to determine whether heat was emanating from inside a 
                                                          
 73  Id. at 361. 
 74  See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Ellis, 270 F. 
Supp. 3d 1134 (2017); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application 
for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. 
Cal. 2015); United States v. Thomas, No. 3:15cr80, 2015 WL 5999313 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2015); 
Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). 
 75  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983). 
 76  Id. at 277. 
 77  Id. at 278–79. 
 78  Id. at 281. 
 79  Id. at 281–82. 
 80  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 
2206, 2217 (2018). 
 81  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
 82  Id. at 708. 
 83  Id. at 712. 
 84  Id. at 718. 
 85  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
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house.86 The scan of the home took a few minutes and was performed from the agents’ 
car.87 The Court held that such behavior is a search because the government used a 
device that was not in general public use “to explore details of the home that would 
[have] previously been unknowable without physical intrusion.”88 
In Jones, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether the attachment of a 
GPS device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of the device to track 
the vehicle’s movements, constitute[d] a search under the Fourth Amendment.”89 The 
government attached a GPS device to the defendant’s vehicle without a proper warrant 
and tracked the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight days.90 Once indicted, the 
defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS device.91 
The district court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was at the 
defendant’s residence;92 however, the court admitted into evidence the data obtained 
while the vehicle was on public streets, evoking Knotts.93 The circuit court for the 
District of Columbia reversed on appeal, holding that the admission of the evidence 
obtained by the warrantless use of a GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment.94 
Affirming the decision of the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that the attachment 
of the GPS device constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because of the 
government’s “physical intrusion on an ‘effect’ for the purpose of obtaining 
information[.]”95 In reaching this decision, the Court utilized the “physical trespass 
test.”96 This holding ignored Knotts by affirming the decision of the circuit court, 
which overruled the district court’s holding that relied on Knotts, to find that no search 
occurred on public thoroughfares.97 
The largest impact for cell phone location information came from the Jones 
concurrences.98 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Katz test 
                                                          
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 30. 
 88  Id. at 40. 
 89  Letter from N. Mark Rapoport, S.C. Senior Assistant Att’y Gen., to Brian Buck, Chief 
of Police, 2012 WL 1260180, at *1 (2012). 
 90  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012). 
 91  Id. at 403. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 404. 
 95  Id. at 400–01. 
 96  Id.; see supra Part II.A. Although the majority applied the “physical trespass test,” the 
concurring opinions focused on the “Katz test.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–31. 
 97  Jones, 565 U.S. at 404. 
 98  Cases relying on Jones include: Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); 
United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2015) (comparing Jones to historical 
CSLI); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013), 
among other older cases. Cases distinguishing Jones include: United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 
498, 514–15 (11th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Jones from historical CSLI); United States v. 
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provides individuals more protection than the test applied by the majority.99 She noted 
that the government can circumvent the Jones holding by enlisting factory-installed 
or owner-installed tracking devices, (i.e., cell phones) instead of physically attaching 
a tracking device.100 Justice Sotomayor stated that the delicate information received 
by the GPS to determine “the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy 
in the sum of one’s public movements” should be taken into account.101 This weakened 
the Knotts holding, implying that a person may have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in GPS data collected on public roads. She also recognized the difficulty in 
determining a reasonable expectation of privacy in society’s present “digital age.”102 
Justice Alito’s concurrence expounded upon the points made by Justice 
Sotomayor. Justice Alito found that continuous monitoring of every single movement 
of an individual’s car for twenty-eight days violated individuals’ reasonable 
expectation of privacy and thus constituted a search.103 He explained that, prior to GPS 
devices, a month-long surveillance of an individual would have been demanding and 
costly, requiring a tremendous amount of resources and people.104 As a result, society’s 
expectation that such surveillance would not happen to them is reasonable.105 
In Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court considered whether using a drug-
sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the home was a 
search.106 The government entered the home’s front porch with a drug-sniffing dog, 
where the dog gave a positive alert for narcotics.107 Based on the alert, the government 
obtained a warrant for a search.108 The Court found that a search occurred when law 
enforcement entered the front porch using the property-based understanding of the 
Fourth Amendment, as it did in Jones.109 
In Justice Kagan’s concurrence, she argued that the government would violate 
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy “when they use trained canine assistants to 
reveal within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise have found 
there.”110 Her reasoning focused on the privacy interest one has in their home, citing 
Kyllo, and the behavior of the government.111 She likened the government’s behavior 
                                                          
Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1016 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–79 
(6th Cir. 2012), among other older cases. 
 99  Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at 416. 
 102  Id. at 417. 
 103  Id. at 428–31 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. 
 106  Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2016). 
 107  Id. at 3–4. 
 108  Id. at 4. 
 109  Id. at 10–11. 
 110  Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 111  Id. at 14–15. 
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to that of a stranger using high-powered binoculars to peer into a house.112 Such 
behavior, she noted, would allow the stranger to learn details of the homeowner’s life 
that were disclosed to no one, invading the homeowner’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy by “nosing into intimacies . . . sensibly thought protected from disclosure.”113 
The Supreme Court in Riley v. California held that the government cannot search 
digital information on a cell phone seized from a person without a warrant.114 In two 
separate cases, police officers seized a cell phone from arrested persons, discovering 
incriminating information after accessing information on the phones.115 In finding that 
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone’s digital 
information, the Court relied on the pervasiveness of cell phones.116 “[M]odern cell 
phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial 
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human 
anatomy.”117 “Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensi-
tive personal information with them as they went about their day. Now it is the person 
who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.”118 The 
Court also found that “[p]rivacy comes at a cost” to law enforcement because 
“[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they 
contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of 
life[.]’”119 
3. Carpenter 
In Carpenter, the Court addressed the issue of “whether the [g]overnment conducts 
a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records 
that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”120 The 
government, without obtaining a warrant, collected cell site records from cell phone 
carriers that revealed the cell phone’s location.121 The Court found this a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, holding that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation 
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”122 
As part of its holding, the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to 
historical CSLI.123 First, the Court found a “world of difference” between the types of 
                                                          
 112  Id. at 13. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). 
 115  Id. at 2480–81. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. at 2484. 
 118  Id. at 2490. 
 119  Id. at 2494–95. 
 120  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
 121  Id. at 2212. 
 122  Id. at 2217. 
 123  Id. at 2220. The third-party doctrine was first established in United States v. Miller, where 
the Court held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily 
turned over to a third party. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Court 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019
538 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:523 
 
personal information addressed in the third-party doctrine and the location information 
“casually collected by wireless carriers today.”124 Second, the Court found that CSLI 
“is not truly ‘shared,’” because CSLI is recorded by simply using the phone “without 
any affirmative act . . . beyond powering [it] up.”125 
In finding a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court relied on the Jones 
concurrences to show an objective expectation of privacy.126 The Court, as in Jones, 
rejected Knotts, finding that “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment 
protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, ‘what [one] seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.’”127 This negates a mechanical reading of Knotts, specifically in the case of 
cell phone location information. Additionally, the Court highlighted the pervasiveness 
of cell phones while emphasizing the ease at which the government can collect 
historical CSLI.128 The Court noted that this combination is similar to the government 
attaching “an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.”129 
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch each dissented. Justice Kennedy 
argued that the majority departed from Fourth Amendment precedent and principles, 
and that it “place[d] undue restrictions on the lawful and necessary enforcement 
powers” of the government.130 He also believed that the third-party doctrine applied 
because cell site records “are no different from the many other kinds of business 
records” and users “do not own, possess, control, or use the [location] records.”131 He 
also argued that CSLI is imprecise.132 Justices Thomas and Alito echoed these 
arguments and believed that the legislature should determine whether a warrant 
showing probable cause is required for the government to collect historical CSLI, not 
the Court.133 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent made three arguments, seemingly believing that 
there should be Fourth Amendment protection for CSLI, but didn’t agree with the 
                                                          
determined that Miller’s bank records were not his own but “business records of the bank.” Id. 
In a separate case applying the third-party doctrine, Smith v. Maryland, the Court found that 
Smith had no expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a telephone for similar reasons. 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). The two factors in the third-party doctrine are 
voluntary exposure and ownership. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
 124  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. at 2217–19. 
 127  Id. at 2217. 
 128  Id. at 2218. 
 129  Id. 
 130  Id. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 131  Id. at 2224, 2229–30. 
 132  Id. at 2225. 
 133  Id. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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majority in how they came to that conclusion.134 Like Justices Alito and Thomas, he 
also believed the legislature was better suited to address this issue.135 
All of these cases lay the groundwork for real-time cell phone tracking. Prior to 
Carpenter, some courts distinguished Jones and applied Knotts, holding that a person 
traveling on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements.136 Courts also applied the third-party doctrine.137 However, Carpenter 
now makes this logic difficult. Carpenter and the Jones concurrences now control, 
and include the principles found in Karo, Kyllo, the Jardines concurrence, and Riley. 
III. CURRENT CASE LAW REGARDING CELL PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION 
Some courts have analyzed the government’s use of a cell phone’s real-time 
location information under the Fourth Amendment.138 Some require a warrant based 
on probable cause before the government can collect such information, while others 
have found that a warrant requiring probable cause is not required.139 Specifically, 
some courts have held that a cell phone’s user has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his or her cell phone’s location information.140 This Section focuses on courts that 
have contemplated the legal standard for which the government is permitted to obtain 
a cell phone user’s real-time location information. Most of these cases focus on the 
collection of real-time cell phone location information. Though others focus on 
historical location information, the legal standard should not be different. These courts 
have applied or distinguished Jones, as well as other doctrines, resulting in conflicting 
rationales and conclusions. These differing opinions can now be resolved under 
Carpenter. 
                                                          
 134  Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The three arguments that Justice Gorsuch made 
were to: (1) “ignore the problem, maintain Smith and Miller, and live with the consequences [i]f 
the confluence of these decisions and modern technology means our Fourth Amendment rights 
are reduced to nearly nothing, so be it[;]” (2) “set Smith and Miller aside and try again using 
the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ jurisprudence that produced them[;]” and (3) “look 
for answers elsewhere[, such as bailment and positive law].” Id. at 2262. 
 135  Id. at 2265–66. 
 136  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230–31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Davis, 785 F.3d at 514–15 
(distinguishing Jones from historical CSLI); United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1016 (6th 
Cir. 2017). 
 137  See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. 
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the third-party doctrine to historical 
CSLI); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145–46 
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 138  United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 
3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 
129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). 
 139  Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 526. 
 140  United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation 
Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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A. Government Access to Cell Phone Location Information Under the Fourth 
Amendment 
Requiring the government to obtain a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to 
collect real-time cell phone location information is necessitated by Carpenter.141 Some 
courts have required such a warrant, however, one remaining issue is whether the 
length of surveillance should be a factor.142 In addition to real-time cell phone location 
information, it is helpful to analyze lower court cases addressing this issue for 
historical cell phone location information. 
In one instance, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Graham, held that the 
government’s acquisition of historical CSLI without a warrant based on probable 
cause was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.143 The court 
correctly found that: 
Examination of a person’s . . . CSLI [enables] the government to trace the 
movements of the cell phone and its user across public and private spaces 
and thereby discover the private activities and personal habits of the user. 
Cell phone users have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
this information.144 
 This holding demonstrates the inapplicability of Knotts. Instead of relying upon 
Knotts, the court relied on Karo and Kyllo in recognizing the sanctity of Fourth 
Amendment protections in the home.145 The court found that CSLI “allow[s] the 
government to place an individual and her personal property—specifically, her cell 
phone—at the person’s home and other private locations at specific points in time.”146 
The precision of CSLI is an important factor, one that the Fourth Circuit correctly 
applied in this case. 
However, in considering the length of surveillance, the court’s focus was on long-
term surveillance.147 The court compared long-term location information disclosed in 
cell phone records to the long-term GPS monitoring in Jones, stating that it “can reveal 
both a comprehensive view and specific details of the individual’s daily life.”148 
Though this is true, short-term surveillance can be just as revealing. Determining a 
cut-off for what is considered long-term surveillance is dangerous because, as found 
                                                          
 141  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 142  See United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Tracey v. Florida, 152 
So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). For cases related to historical CSLI, see United States v. Graham, 796 
F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal 
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal 2015); United States v. Thomas, No. 3:15cr80, 
2015 WL 5999313 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2015). 
 143  Graham, 796 F.3d at 338 (admitting CSLI because “the government relied in good faith 
on court orders.”). 
 144  Id. at 344–45. 
 145  Id. at 346. 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id. at 347. 
 148  Id. at 348. The court determined that long-term monitoring is at least fourteen days. Id. 
at 350. 
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in Tracey v. Florida, it can result in “arbitrary and inequitable enforcement.”149 For 
this reason, the Florida Supreme Court rejected an approach based on the interval of 
time location information was collected.150 The court noted the difficulty for law 
enforcement to know whether a warrant is needed if lines were drawn regarding the 
length of location information collection.151 The length of surveillance should not be 
a factor in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. A person’s 
Fourth Amendment rights can be violated within minutes of tracking via collection of 
real-time cell phone location information if such collection is done without a warrant 
based on probable cause. Time is not discriminatory. Otherwise, the precedent set in 
Graham may result in such “arbitrary and inequitable” enforcement. 152 
In Tracey, the Florida Supreme Court found that one has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in his or her real-time location information.153 The court recognized the 
pervasiveness of cell phones, similar to the Supreme Court in Riley.154 In finding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court found that “‘a significant portion” of 
Americans use cell phones for various purposes, such as email, text-messaging, 
scheduling, and banking.155 The court also found that people normally carry cell 
phones on their person making “a cell phone’s movements its owner’s movements.”156 
The court acknowledged that this pervasiveness violates the principles in Karo, Kyllo, 
and Jardines.157 The court stated that “cell phone tracking can easily invade the right 
to privacy in one’s home or other private areas, a matter that the government cannot 
always anticipate and one which, when it occurs, is clearly a Fourth Amendment 
violation.”158 The court correctly noted it as a violation because the Amendment 
protects the rights of United States citizens to be secure in their houses.159 Second, the 
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant that particularly describes the place searched.160 
Without the government knowing precisely where the phone is, tracking a cell phone 
without a warrant is akin to a general warrant. Additionally, the court found that cell 
phones are more pervasive than the beeper in Knotts because “Knotts did not 
knowingly obtain, consciously carry, and purposely use the beeper for all manner of 
                                                          
 149  Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504, 521 (Fla. 2014). 
 150  Id. at 521. 
 151  Id. 
 152  See United States v. Thomas, No. 3:15cr80, 2015 WL 5999313, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13, 
2015) (relying on Graham in finding that law enforcement “must obtain a warrant before 
acquiring long-term historical CSLI.”). Though the court determined a warrant was required, 
the precedent set in Graham related to long-term monitoring should be ignored. 
 153  Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 526. 
 154  Id. at 524. 
 155  Id. at 523 (citation omitted). 
 156  Id. at 525. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. at 524. 
 159  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 160  Id. 
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personal and necessary functions, as occurs with cell phones.”161 The Court cited Jones 
to further distinguish Knotts, making it clear that Knotts is not applicable to real-time 
tracking.162 
The court also recognized that cell phones automatically connect to cell sites.163 
The court rejected the argument that an individual voluntarily turns over his or her 
location information, finding that users do not “convey [real-time CSLI] to the service 
provider for any purpose other than to enable use of his cell phone for its intended 
purpose.”164 The court also noted that “[r]equiring a cell phone user to turn off the cell 
phone just to assure privacy from governmental intrusion . . . places an unreasonable 
burden on the user to forego necessary use of his cell phone, a device now considered 
essential by much of the populace.”165 The Florida Supreme Court correctly found a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, relying on the pervasiveness of cell phones, the 
inapplicability of Knotts, the Jones concurrences, the involuntary conveyance of real-
time CSLI, and the need to disregard the length of surveillance. 
In United States v. Ellis, the government monitored defendant’s cell phone in real-
time.166 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held 
that “cell phone users have an expectation of privacy in their cell phone location in 
real time and that society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”167 
The court determined, similar to the Tracey court, that individuals “keep their phones 
on their person or within reach[,]” making cell phones “a close proxy to one’s actual 
physical location.”168 The court adopted the reasoning in In Re: Application for 
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation169 (“Telephone 
Information”) to come to this conclusion—a case where the court affirmed the denial 
of the government’s application to obtain historical CSLI.170 The Telephone 
Information court found the following principles present in the government’s request 
for historical CSLI:  
(1) an individual’s expectation of privacy is at its pinnacle when 
government surveillance intrudes on the home; (2) long-term electronic 
surveillance by the government implicates an individual’s expectation of 
privacy; and (3) location data generated by cell phones, which are 
                                                          
 161  Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 524. 
 162  Id. at 525. 
 163  Id. at 507. 
 164  Id. at 525. 
 165  Id. at 523. 
 166  United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
 167  Id. at 1145. 
 168  Id. 
 169  In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1011, 1023–25 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 170  Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 1145–46. 
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ubiquitous in this day and age, can reveal a wealth of private information 
about an individual.171  
Other than a focus on long-term surveillance, which should not be a factor, the court’s 
rationale was similar to that in Tracey. 
When discussing the ubiquity of cell phones, the Telephone Information court 
found persuasive the fact that CSLI is “generated by passive activities” such as 
connecting to a base station, apps running in the background, and the receipt of calls 
and text messages.172 The court also noted, correctly, that “even though a user may 
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy by disabling an app’s location 
identification features,” the phone still generates CSLI.173 The court also rejected any 
notion of discarding or turning off cell phones.174 The fact that “cell phones are not a 
luxury good” but “an essential part of living in modern society[,]” is exactly the reason 
why individuals should not have to “choose between maintaining their Fourth 
Amendment right . . . and using a device that has become so integral to functioning in 
today’s society.”175 The court acknowledged that “it is untenable to force individuals 
to disconnect from society just so they can avoid having their movements 
subsequently tracked by the government.”176 Specifically, the court held: 
[U]nless a person is willing to live ‘off the grid,’ it is nearly impossible to 
avoid disclosing the most personal of information . . . on a constant basis, 
just to navigate daily life. And the thought that the government should be 
able to access such information without the basic protection that a warrant 
offers is nothing less than chilling.177 
The courts in these cases were correct in their findings, using the original purpose 
of the Fourth Amendment as its guide—to prevent a police state and thwart arbitrary 
government power. 
B. Big Brother’s False Hope: Unbound Government Access to Cell Phone Location 
Information 
Some courts have found that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment is not 
required to collect real-time cell phone location information.178 The reasoning used in 
these cases conflict with Carpenter by relying on the third-party doctrine and ignoring 
the role cell phones play in today’s society. These cases cannot be relied upon when 
addressing future cases where the government requests real-time cell phone location 
information without a warrant showing probable cause. 
                                                          
 171  In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1022. 
 172  Id. at 1024. 
 173  Id. at 1025. 
 174  Id. at 1035–36. 
 175  Id. at 1035. 
 176  Id. at 1036. 
 177  Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
 178  See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation 
Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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In United States v. Riley (“Riley 6th Cir.”), the Sixth Circuit held that individuals 
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time location information.179 
The court relied on a Sixth Circuit case in which the Sixth Circuit held that an 
individual has no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and location of 
his cell phone” when he “voluntarily use[s]” it.180 The Sixth Circuit leaned heavily 
upon its precedent, incorrectly stating that one must turn off his or her cell phone to 
avoid ever-present monitoring.181 The court also relied upon Knotts, erroneously 
believing that “because ‘the defendant’s movements could have been observed by any 
member of the public,’” he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his real-time 
CSLI.182 
In a separate case, In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, the court held 
that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time location 
information.183 The court found that prospective CSLI fell under the third-party 
doctrine.184 The court relied on the assumption that a cell phone user is “well aware” 
that the phone uses location information and can turn off the phone to stop it from 
doing so.185 In In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, as with Riley 6th Cir., 
the court focused on the assumption that cell phone users voluntarily convey their real-
time CSLI, therefore waiving any reasonable expectation of privacy in such 
information.186 
The reasoning in these cases is flawed. Real-time CSLI does not fall under the 
third-party doctrine, as evidenced by Carpenter rejecting its application to historical 
CSLI.187 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor alluded to the inapplicability of the third-
party doctrine to GPS tracking in her Jones concurrence by stating that it is “ill-suited 
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves 
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”188 Additionally, location 
information is not always voluntarily conveyed; and “[i]ndividuals cannot be 
                                                          
 179  Riley, 858 F.3d at 1013. 
 180  Id. at 1013, 1017 (citing United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir.)); see also 
Matthew DeVoy Jones, The “Orwellian Consequence” of Smartphone Tracking: Why a 
Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment Is Required Prior to Collection of GPS Data from 
Smartphones, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 211 (2014) (arguing that Skinner’s position is incorrect). 
 181  Riley, 858 F.3d at 1018. 
 182  Id. at 1017; see also United States v. Wallace, 857 F.3d 685, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(decision substituted by United States v. Wallace, 885 F.3d 806). In Wallace the Fifth Circuit 
found that prospective CSLI fell under the third-party doctrine, in addition to relying upon Sixth 
Circuit precedent. The decision which substituted this finding decided not to address whether 
obtaining prospective CSLI constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Wallace, 885 F.3d at 810. 
 183  See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 
2013).  
 184  Id. at 146. 
 185  Id. at 146–47. 
 186  Id. at 147. 
 187  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). 
 188  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012). 
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compelled to choose between maintaining their Fourth Amendment right to privacy in 
their location and using a device that has become so integral to functioning in today’s 
society.”189 For these reasons, neither Riley 6th Cir. nor In re Smartphone Geolocation 
Data Application can be looked to for guidance. The arguments made in these cases 
will be struck down, respectfully, in Section IV. 
IV. REQUIRING A WARRANT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR REAL-TIME CELL 
PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION 
This Section argues that a warrant based on probable cause is required prior to the 
government’s collection of real-time cell phone location information to locate an 
individual. First, this Section counters arguments made in Riley 6th Cir., In re 
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, and the Carpenter dissents. This Section 
then explains that Fourth Amendment legal standards apply to real-time cell phone 
location information. 
A. Rejecting Arguments that a Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment Is Not 
Required to Collect Real-Time Cell Phone Location Information 
Many arguments have been made as to why cell phone users should not have any 
expectation of privacy, subjectively or objectively, in the real-time location 
information collected from their phone. Many of these arguments were made prior to 
Carpenter. Due to the fallacy of these arguments, a warrant pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment is required. 
The most common argument against one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
or her real-time cell phone location information is that such information is voluntarily 
conveyed to a third-party, and as such, the user has no ownership interest in the 
location information.190 This argument ignores that such information is not always 
conveyed voluntarily. Real-time cell phone location information is voluntarily 
conveyed when the user overtly makes a call, sends a text or email, or posts his or her 
location on an app.191 Yet, this information is not voluntarily conveyed when a user 
receives calls, texts, or emails, or apps are running in the background.192 Even though 
location information may be “voluntarily” conveyed, it is often not the intention of the 
user. The user makes an intentional act that causes the cell phone to connect to a tower, 
and therefore reveal real-time location information. However, the information was 
revealed to use the phone for its intended purpose, not to share his or her location. A 
cell phone user cannot be said to “voluntarily” convey to his or her service provider 
information that was generated by the service provider without the user’s involvement. 
Even more important in striking down this argument, Carpenter did not extend the 
third-party doctrine to historical CSLI.193 The Court seconded Justice Sotomayor in 
                                                          
 189  In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. 
Supp. 3d 1011, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
 190  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–24 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2235 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 
1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015); 
In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 191  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210. 
 192  Id. 
 193  Id. 
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Jones, where she stated that the third-party doctrine was “ill-suited to the digital age, 
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in 
the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”194 This reasoning also applies to real-time 
cell phone location information because users convey location information while 
simply carrying the phone on their person. People use cell phones for “mundane tasks” 
such as communicating with family, accessing the Internet, checking account 
balances, and for a growing number of other reasons. Because real-time cell phone 
location information can be conveyed without the user doing anything more than 
turning the phone on, it is incorrect to apply the third-party doctrine to such 
information. Turning off one’s cell phone does not resolve the problem of one wanting 
to keep his or her location information private either. As previously noted, nearly all 
Americans own a cell phone, cell phones are constantly kept on one’s person or close-
by, and living without a cell phone would make life difficult as cell phones are such 
an important part of today’s world. To require a cell phone user to turn off his or her 
phone in order to shield himself or herself from unconstitutional government intrusion 
is not the act of a free country. No one buys a cell phone to share detailed information 
about his or her whereabouts with the government. Because this information is easily 
collected by wireless carriers and reveals a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical 
presence,” the fact that a third party holds this information is irrelevant.195 
Moreover, the detailed location information is not of the same type considered by 
the third-party doctrine. The information considered in the third-party doctrine—
telephone and bank records, among others—does not reveal such a “detailed 
chronicle” of an individual’s physical presence as does real-time cell phone location 
information. It is true that telephone and bank records may reveal private associations; 
however, such records do not show that the person actually attended any private 
meetings, appointments, or political rallies. As such, records under the third-party 
doctrine have certain limitations, where the “detailed and comprehensive record of the 
[cell phone user’s] movements” collected through real-time cell phone location 
information presents no limitation to what such information can reveal.196 The records 
that fall under the third-party doctrine focus on points in time where an individual 
affirmatively uses technology, whereas real-time cell phone location information is 
constantly generated, at times, without any affirmative act by its user. Carpenter noted 
this “unique nature of cell phone location records” stating that such records 
“implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in [the third-party 
doctrine].”197 In fact, when the third-party doctrine was first introduced “in 1979, few 
could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, 
conveying . . . a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements.”198 
Another argument against applying the Fourth Amendment is that the warrantless 
collection of location information serves a compelling government interest. This 
argument was made by Justices Kennedy and Alito in Carpenter in relation to 
                                                          
 194  Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 195  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 196  Id. at 2217. 
 197  Id. at 2220. 
 198  Id. at 2217. 
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historical CSLI.199 Both believed that requiring a warrant based on probable cause 
unreasonably burdens the government to the advantage of criminals.200 They argued 
that CSLI is used to establish probable cause and that requiring a warrant would cause 
“[m]any investigations to sputter out at the start.”201 
There is no doubt that law enforcement tactics must advance with technological 
changes and that apprehending criminals is an important government interest. 
However, this advancement and interest must not come at the expense of personal 
liberties. If law enforcement tactics advance, so too must the protections guaranteed 
under the Fourth Amendment. Otherwise, the government could circumvent the 
Constitution, eliciting “Orwellian consequences” contrary to American liberty and 
freedom. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in Jones, “because GPS 
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by 
design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive 
law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’”202 
“Much like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and 
efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a button, the 
[g]overnment can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location 
information at practically no expense.”203 This outweighs any government interest in 
apprehending criminals because it presents opportunity for abuse. As noted by 
Carpenter, the warrantless collection of cell phone location information risks 
“[g]overnment encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the lessons of 
history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.”204 This is important because, as 
previously mentioned, the purpose of the Amendment is to curb arbitrary government 
power. Allowing the government warrantless collection of this information would 
place “‘the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.’”205 
Further, requiring a warrant will not limit the effectiveness of law enforcement in 
solving crimes. Warrants can be obtained without the use of real-time cell phone 
location information. In fact, law enforcement has obtained warrants without such 
information for centuries. Though it may be an additional step in the government’s 
                                                          
 199  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 200  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 201  See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 202  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012). 
 203  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.  
 204  Id. at 2223. 
 205  Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, 20, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing James Otis). 
Referring back to the introductory scenario, let’s assume a police officer was very fond of Mrs. 
Jeffries and, as a result, hated Mr. Jeffries. The officer could either follow Mrs. Jeffries using 
her phone’s real-time location information to know her whereabouts in hopes of 
“coincidentally” running into her. The officer could also follow Mr. Jeffries using his phone’s 
real-time location information to confront him or devise a plan to make him look guilty of a 
crime. 
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process, technology has aided the government in obtaining warrants faster and more 
efficiently.206 
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment already accounts for any burden that the 
warrant requirement may pose to law enforcement by allowing warrantless searches 
and seizures under certain circumstances.207 Requiring a warrant based on probable 
cause, therefore, does not impede law enforcement’s task of arresting criminals. 
Neither is it unreasonable to require the government to obtain a warrant based on 
probable cause because warrants are required for other types of searches and 
seizures.208 Real-time cell phone location information should be no different. Due to 
the information that can be gleaned from real-time cell phone location information, 
the ease in which the government can collect it, and the protections in place to prevent 
any burden the warrant requirement may present to law enforcement, it is clear that a 
warrant is needed to curb the government’s power as required by the Framer’s intent. 
“Privacy comes at a cost”—the warrant requirement is an important function of 
American government, not an inconvenience to be weighed against claims of law 
enforcement efficiency.209 
Another argument presented by Justice Kennedy is that after Carpenter, the 
government will not know what information it can and cannot collect without a 
warrant.210 I respectfully disagree. Carpenter clearly states that a warrant is required 
to obtain historical CSLI.211 The same would be true for real-time cell phone location 
information. If law enforcement were to follow Carpenter, it would understand that 
because the third-party doctrine was not extended to historical CSLI, it would not 
extend to any similar information, such as real-time cell phone location information, 
that would allow the government to obtain private and detailed information with 
minimal effort.212 
Another common argument is that CSLI does not reveal any private information 
about an individual.213 Justice Kennedy argued that CSLI is imprecise, unlike GPS, 
and at its most precise reveals a user’s location within an area covering a dozen city 
                                                          
 206  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569 
U.S. 141, 152–56 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In McNeely, 
Chief Justice Roberts stated that “police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads 
[and] judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 
minutes.” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152–56. 
 207  See supra text accompanying note 65.  
 208  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (holding that the government’s 
physical intrusion required a warrant); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) 
(police obtained a warrant to search defendant’s home). 
 209  Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95. 
 210  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 211  Id. at 2221. 
 212  In addition to real-time cell phone location information, the third-party doctrine will not 
apply to “smart” devices, such as Alexa. Arguments for excluding “smart” devices from the 
third-party doctrine is that they are located in one’s home and can reveal detailed information 
similar to that of a cell phone. 
 213  United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 516 (11th Cir. 2015); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 
2225, 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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blocks.214 This is simply untrue. In some instances, CSLI is nearly as precise as GPS, 
and in highly populated areas, a cell phone can reveal location information within the 
nearest foot.215 In fact, precision will continue to grow as more cell sites are put into 
operation. For instance, in 2017 a record number of cell sites were in operation.216 
Additionally, GPS can create a precise location of a cell phone within fifteen feet.217 
This fact, then, erases any doubt that real-time cell phone location information does 
not reveal any private information about an individual. Because individuals 
“compulsively carry” their phone on their person, and location information is precise 
and continues to grow even more precise, people can be located within feet of their 
physical location.218 Based on determining one’s location, the government can 
determine an individual’s habits, beliefs, and affiliations. For example, the CPD was 
able to determine that Mr. and Mrs. Jefferies visited tourist attractions during their 
stay in Chicago. It is not unlikely that the CPD also determined what food the Jeffries’ 
preferred, whether they attended any religious ceremonies or participated in ongoing 
protests during their visit because their phones followed them “beyond public 
thoroughfares and into . . . potentially revealing locales.”219 
An additional argument, advanced by Riley 6th Cir. and Justice Kennedy, is that 
Jones is not applicable to the collection of cell phone location information.220 The 
focus of this argument revolves around the differences between the methods used to 
collect information, specifically direct government involvement versus judicial 
intervention, and GPS versus CSLI. It is true that there was a physical trespass in Jones 
and there is not when the government collects CSLI. It is also true that GPS is different 
than CSLI. However, such distinctions do not render Jones inapplicable in cases where 
the government collects real-time cell phone location information. Much like GPS 
monitoring, real-time cell phone location information can reveal a comprehensive and 
detailed record of an individual’s daily life.221 Real-time cell phone location 
information may reveal more private material than GPS, because cell phones are 
carried on one’s person unlike the GPS in Jones. Further, allowing the government to 
access such information, without a Constitutional check by the judiciary, is 
problematic. It allows the government to gather location information without knowing 
“in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.”222 “Only 
the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”223 
                                                          
 214  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225, 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 215  Id. at 2233. 
 216  Andy Szal, US Mobile Date Use, Cell Cites Set New Records in 2017, Industry Group 
Says, ECN (July 11, 2018), https://www.ecnmag.com/news/2018/07/us-mobile-data-use-cell-
sites-set-new-records-2017-industry-group-says. 
 217  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225. 
 218  See id. at 2218 (majority opinion). 
 219  Id. 
 220  See id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1016 
(6th Cir. 2017). 
 221  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. 
 222  Id. at 2218. 
 223  Id. 
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B. Following the Signals: Fourth Amendment Case Law 
Katz, Knotts, Karo, Kyllo, Jones, Jardines, Riley, and Carpenter have laid the 
foundation for addressing the issue of the warrantless collection of real-time cell phone 
location information. These cases recognize that a search occurs when: a person 
expects privacy in the thing searched or seized, and society believes that expectation 
is reasonable; or the government trespasses on a searched or seized person’s 
property.224 In the case of nearly all cell phone users, the government does not place a 
device on or in the suspect’s phone to follow their movements. Rather, the phone emits 
signals to cell service providers’ “base stations” while also containing a factory-
embedded GPS device.225 Because there is no trespass by the government, the Jones 
concurrences and Carpenter control, as both applied the Katz reasonable expectation 
of privacy test. 
1. Untying Knotts from Real-Time Cell Phone Location Information Monitoring 
Applying Knotts to cases where real-time cell phone location information is 
collected by the government should cease. Knotts should not apply to such cases 
because the facts in Knotts are clearly distinguishable and Jones and Carpenter have 
effectively rendered Knotts inapplicable to such cases. 
If Knotts were applied to real-time cell phone location information, the 
government would be permitted to track an individual through the use of a cell phone 
emitting real-time location information. This would mean that whenever cell phone 
users are carrying their cell phones on their person in public, which nearly all do, the 
government could legally follow their every move without any check on its ability to 
do so. It would grant the government permission to track a person and discover every 
place he or she goes, without particularly describing the location of the person they 
intend to track, and in some instances who to track, or providing probable cause of 
any wrongdoing. Distinguishing Knotts is therefore essential. 
Knotts is distinguishable because cell phones blur the distinction between public 
and private places, emitting signals from both places, whereas the GPS in Knotts was 
placed onto the car specifically for the purpose of tracking the defendant, which could 
only be done in public.226 The government in Knotts, therefore, could only track the 
defendant on public roads, whereas currently, the government has no way of knowing, 
in advance, whether it is monitoring a person’s phone in public or private. This violates 
Karo, which prevents the government from monitoring a tracking device in a private 
residence.227 This also violates the principles in Kyllo and Jardines, which highlight 
the privacy interests one has in his or her home.228 Even if a person was in public, 
                                                          
 224  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012); Katz v. United States, 
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however, as Justice Sotomayor and the majority in Jones concluded, a person might 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements.229 Justices 
Sotomayor and Alito concluded that continuous monitoring of individuals’ public 
movements violates their reasonable expectation of privacy.230 After the Jones 
decision, the rule expressed in Knotts was substantially weakened. 
Carpenter weakened Knotts further. The Court recognized that Knotts does not 
apply to historical CSLI because individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with 
them all the time” which allows the government to track a cell phone user’s location 
with “near perfect surveillance, as if it ha[d] attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s 
user.”231 This inescapabilty of cell phone technology further separates Knotts from 
real-time cell phone location information. If the government could track individuals 
from the comfort of an office chair without requiring a warrant, only the hermit would 
have an advantage. “A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by 
venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, ‘what [one] seeks to preserve as 
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’”232 
As with historical CSLI, real-time cell phone location information reveals “a 
detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled . . . every moment” of 
every day.233 It is clear that Knotts has run its course and is no longer applicable to 
such cases, as expressed in Jones and Carpenter, because tracking individuals without 
a warrant based on probable cause on public thoroughfares results in a reasonable 
breach of privacy in individuals’ public movements. “Allowing government access to 
cell-site records contravenes [society’s] expectation” that law enforcement could not, 
and would not, “secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement” of an 
individual.234 Knotts, therefore, cannot be applied for the aforementioned reasons. 
2. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Real-Time Cell Phone Location 
Information 
Katz provides the two-step inquiry of whether there are subjective and objective 
expectations of privacy.235 The first inquiry, the subjective question, is fact based and 
can be determined by looking at whether the individual who claimed a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights actually believed he had privacy rights in the location 
information emanating from his cell phone. It has been argued that the subjective 
prong is no longer addressed by courts.236 Case law appears to support this argument, 
however, it is still important to discuss. 
Many individuals are unaware that making or receiving a call or text message, or 
using apps on their cell phone will create a record of their whereabouts, which clearly 
                                                          
 229  See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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weighs in favor of finding a subjective expectation of privacy.237 However, more cell 
phone users are becoming aware that such activity does create a location record. 
Although this fact is known, individuals with such knowledge may still have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time cell phone location information, 
even when such a belief is erroneous.238 Not recognizing an expectation of privacy 
when one knows that their privacy can be infringed upon will eventually result in no 
privacy expectations as technology becomes more invasive. For instance, innocent 
bystanders to a crime, such as the Jeffries, may understand that they can be tracked 
for days by the government, but because they committed no crime, the expectation is 
that their movements will not be tracked. Therefore, knowledge that cell phones create 
a location record should not mean that individuals lack a subjective expectation of 
privacy in their smartphone’s GPS data. 
Further, the fact that cell phone users accept terms and conditions does not negate 
a subjective expectation of privacy. Many service provider and app terms and 
conditions are lengthy and difficult for a reasonable person to understand. For this 
reason, the vast majority of cell phone users accept terms and conditions without even 
reading them. Additionally, the privacy policies of the four largest service providers 
in the United States do not state that location information will be collected by the 
government in cases other than emergencies. Only one policy states that location 
information may be disclosed to the government when served with lawful process. So 
even if terms and conditions are read, there is no disclosure to users, absent the one 
provider, stating that location information will be willingly shared with the 
government. Taken together, it is within the realm of reason that individuals have a 
subjective expectation of privacy in their real-time cell phone location information. 
The second inquiry, the objective question, is more difficult to address. Whether 
there is an objective expectation of privacy, or whether society believes that an 
individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, will change over time. The vast 
majority of individuals with cell phones carry their phones on their person, in essence, 
creating a tracking device that they carry with them at all times.239 This allows the 
government to achieve near perfect surveillance of the location of a cell phone without 
concern about who is carrying the phone, where the phone is located, or whether 
government agents are actively monitoring the phone.240 It grants the government the 
opportunity to trace an individual’s every movement without any obstacles.241 This 
means that real-time cell phone location information provides information twenty-four 
hours a day, encouraging “broad and indiscriminate” law enforcement practices.242 It 
is hard to argue, that as Americans, we would expect, or should accept, such law 
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enforcement practices, “condemning each of us to live in fear that we could be 
surveilled at any time or all the time.”243 
In addition to there being a clear objective expectation of privacy, there are 
supplementary concerns that weigh in favor of an objective expectation of privacy. 
One such concern is that a person may be in his or her home when the location 
information is collected. Collecting this information while the phone’s user is in his 
or her home violates Karo. It also implicates Kyllo and the Jardines concurrence, in 
that location information reveals details that could not otherwise be obtained absent a 
warrant. The only way to ensure that an individual is not in a private residence is to 
take note of this through visual surveillance. Without visual surveillance, law 
enforcement would not know whether someone is in a private residence. Requiring a 
warrant based on probable cause easily circumvents the problem of collecting real-
time cell phone location information while in a private residence. 
Another concern is that real-time cell phone location information, like GPS data 
and historical CSLI, “is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.”244 As 
Carpenter noted, this “time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s 
life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, 
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’” because “[a] cell phone 
faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences, 
doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.”245 
Decades ago, “few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its 
owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier . . . a detailed and comprehensive record 
of the person’s movements.”246 This compilation of “public” information from 
continual collection of real-time cell phone location information gives the government 
information that a normal person could not otherwise obtain. In essence, it is similar 
to having a person that you do not know follow you for hours, days, or weeks on end, 
or permitting the government to place a tracking device on your person. It is extremely 
unlikely that anyone would condone and welcome such behavior. For example, when 
a stranger sees a person running, the stranger may infer that the individual is conscious 
of his or her health, but little more. When the government has this same information, 
collected through real-time tracking, the government can make inferences that the 
stranger cannot. This is a clear invasion of privacy.247 Continuous monitoring was 
addressed in Jones, where Justice Alito stated that it violates an objective expectation 
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of privacy and thus constitutes a search.248 Carpenter furthered the rationale in Jones, 
applying it to cell phones.249 
Though Carpenter’s issue was one of the government’s “ability to chronicle a 
person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals[,]”250 and 
specifically did not express any views on real-time tracking,251 the decision and its 
supporting arguments make Carpenter the definitive case as it relates to tracking 
individuals using real time cell phone location information. First, it took into account 
the most recent Supreme Court rulings and rationale, applying the principles from 
those cases to historical cell phone location information.252 For instance, the Court 
relied on Riley to highlight the pervasiveness of cell phones and their vast storage 
capacity of sensitive information,253 Kyllo to emphasize that the government, absent a 
warrant, could not capitalize on new technology to explore what was happening within 
the home,254 and the Jones concurrences to support its holding that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements because 
such information holds the privacies of life.255 Carpenter’s reliance on Jones is 
important because it can also be used to support real-time cell phone location 
information.256 In fact, real-time cell phone location information includes GPS.257 
An additional concern is abuse of power by the government. This was discussed 
in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones:258 
[T]he Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal 
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS 
monitoring [gives law enforcement] a relatively low cost and substantial 
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the government, 
in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track, and may “alter the relationship 
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic 
society.259 
She further stated that this unwelcomed power would defeat the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
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Justice Sotomayor’s description of the government sounds eerily similar to the one 
in George Orwell’s novel, 1984.260 In 1984, Orwell wrote, 
[T]he telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously . . . . There was 
of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given 
moment. How often, or on what system, the [police] plugged in on any 
individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched 
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire 
whenever they wanted to. You had to live—did live, from habit that became 
instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, 
except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.261 
Although Orwell’s recital may seem extreme or farfetched science fiction, it no longer 
is. Orwell’s telescreen is the modern-day cell phone. It receives and transmits radio 
signals simultaneously by connecting to base stations. There is no way to know 
whether the government is “watching” you by collecting real-time cell phone location 
information, or at what location they are gathering such information. It is even 
conceivable that they “watch” everybody all the time. In fact, smart televisions, 
refrigerators, personal assistants, and other smart devices are increasingly becoming 
the norm. Add that with the fact that law enforcement can monitor cell phone users’ 
every move at any given moment, and it is recognizable that what was written as 
science fiction is not such anymore.262 
Also relevant to the concern of government abuse are the reasons the Framers 
drafted the Amendment, despite the fact that cell phones and real-time location 
information were not in existence during its creation. Not requiring a warrant based 
on probable cause permits the government to obtain real-time cell phone location 
information without particularly describing the location of the person they intend to 
track, while at the same time monitoring any place that the cell phone user goes—
possibly not knowing who the person is, only the associated phone number.263 Not 
requiring a warrant or probable cause may also allow the government to track a person 
without describing any connection to the crime investigated.264 Such behavior would 
resemble the government’s use of general warrants during colonial America and the 
fear of the Framers—a too permeating police force. 
The precise reason the Amendment was adopted was to curb the use of general 
warrants, not permit them to occur hundreds of years later.265 James Madison believed 
that “there are more instances of the abridgement of freedom of the people by gradual 
and silent encroachments by those in power than by violent and sudden 
usurpations.”266 Further, as established by the Florida Supreme Court: 
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[T]he ease with which the government, armed with current and ever-
expanding technology, can now monitor and track our cell phones, and thus 
ourselves, with minimal expenditure of funds and manpower, is just the 
type of ‘gradual and silent encroachment’ into the very details of our lives 
that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent.267  
It is therefore clear that the original intent of the Fourth Amendment protects society 
against the warrantless collection of real-time cell phone location information. 
It is apparent that when the government uses real-time cell phone location 
information to locate an individual, that person has a subjective and, more importantly, 
an objective expectation of privacy in this location information. Therefore, there exists 
an objective expectation of privacy, which raises concerns about what information the 
government collects and why it is collected, implicating the Fourth Amendment and 
requiring a warrant based on probable cause. 
V. SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF WARRANTLESS COLLECTION OF REAL-TIME CELL 
PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION 
There are two proposed solutions to ensure that individuals’ Fourth Amendment 
rights are not violated by the warrantless collection of real-time cell phone location 
information. The first option is for the United States Supreme Court to take up the 
issue that it avoided in Carpenter. The second option is for Congress to pass legislation 
regarding such information. Failing to resolve this matter could result in violations of 
the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, federal case law is conflicted on this issue, 
which may result in bad law becoming precedent in a growing area of jurisprudence. 
It is through either of these solutions that the proper protections will be afforded to the 
vast majority of United States citizens. 
A. Legislature 
The most agreeable solution is for Congress to pass legislation dealing with the 
government’s collection of real-time cell phones location information. Justice Alito 
stated in Jones that, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the 
best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”268 For one, Congress is better 
situated than the courts to gauge public attitudes.269 Additionally, Congress can draw 
detailed lines and balance privacy and public safety better than the courts.270 
“Because the collection and storage of cell-site records affects nearly every 
American, it is unlikely that the question whether the current law requires 
strengthening will escape Congress’s notice.”271 Members of Congress must fulfill 
their duties and listen to their constituents, rather than their donors, and address this 
issue. If Congress fails to act, the Supreme Court will have to continue to restrict the 
third-party doctrine and to expand Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to include real-
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time cell phone location information. As Justice Alito stated in Carpenter, 
“[l]egislation is much preferable.”272 
B. Judiciary 
The Court must follow the Jones concurrences and Carpenter until Congress acts 
on real-time cell phone location information. Any case regarding real-time cell phone 
location information should simply refuse to extend the third-party doctrine to real-
time cell phone location information, since the rationale in Carpenter would apply. 
The decision should not take into account the length of time an individual is 
monitored, as short-term cell phone monitoring presents the same Fourth Amendment 
concerns as long-term monitoring. Nor should a distinction be made between GPS and 
real-time CSLI emanating from the cell phone, as discussed in Section IV. 
One possible issue with this approach is if there is a plurality opinion, as in Jones, 
which could cause some confusion. This may be likely as the Court continues its 
change under the current administration. 
Another possible issue is that the Court may have already opened the door to more 
litigation in finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI. It may have 
also limited one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in other location information, 
such as real-time cell phone location information, as its holding in Carpenter was 
narrow, and lower courts have incorrectly applied case law to the government’s 
collection of real-time cell phone location information. This could actually limit one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location information if lower 
courts distinguish Carpenter or rely on previous lower court rulings. For these reasons, 
the Court must take on a case involving the warrantless monitoring of real-time cell 
phone location information until Congress acts. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Technological advancements are continuing to modify and influence criminal law. 
Cell phones provide individuals greater access to the world, while also providing the 
government greater access into individuals’ private lives. It is important that the law 
surrounding real-time cell phone location information advance with technology to 
protect people in society, like the Jeffries couple and Mr. Rivera-Guerrero. In their 
situation, a warrant based on probable cause should have been obtained prior to the 
collection of their real-time cell phone location information. To do otherwise reduces 
Fourth Amendment protections and raises privacy concerns. 
This Article argued that a warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment is required 
before the government can monitor an individual by collecting the real-time cell phone 
location information from the individual’s phone. Section II presented a legal 
background of information, focusing on the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court 
case law dealing with the government’s electronic surveillance of individuals. Section 
III presented recent case law on law enforcement’s collection of cell phone location 
information. Section IV explained why a warrant based on probable cause is required 
to collect such information, focusing on legal and public policy arguments. Section V 
illustrated two concrete solutions to resolve this problem. 
To uphold individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights, it is necessary that a warrant 
under the Fourth Amendment be required prior to the government’s collection of real-
time cell phone location information emanating from any cell phone. To do otherwise 
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is accepting Orwell’s “Big Brother” government as our own—allowing law 
enforcement to “watch” our every move using our “telescreens.” Jones laid the 
foundation by refusing to apply Knotts, weakening Knotts’ holding, as well as the 
arguments of the courts that relied on it. Carpenter took it further and found a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI. The Fourth Amendment and case 
law require a warrant based on probable cause, ensuring constitutional protection for 
the United States’ citizenry. For these reasons, a warrant based on probable cause 
under the Fourth Amendment must be obtained before law enforcement can track an 
individual by obtaining the real-time cell phone location information emanating from 
his or her cell phone. 
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